Trade and investment in Latin America and Asia: Lessons from the past and potential perspectives from further integration by Berisha-Krasniqi, Valdete et al.
 
 
IFPRI Discussion Paper 01060 
January 2011 
Trade and Investment in Latin America and Asia 
 






Markets, Trade and Institutions Division   
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was established in 1975. IFPRI is one of 15 
agricultural research centers that receive principal funding from governments, private foundations, and 
international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
PARTNERS AND CONTRIBUTORS  
IFPRI gratefully acknowledges the generous unrestricted funding from Australia, Canada, China, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the World 
Bank. 
AUTHORS 
Valdete Berisha-Krasniqi, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Research Assistant, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division 
v.berisha@cgiar.org  
 
Antoine Bouët, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Senior Research Fellow, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division  
a.bouet@cgiar.org  
 
Carmen Estrades, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Senior Research Assistant, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division 
c.estrades@cgiar.org  
 
David Laborde, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Research Fellow, Markets, Trade and Institutions Division  
d.laborde@cgiar.org  
Notices 
1 Effective January 2007, the Discussion Paper series within each division and the Director General’s Office of IFPRI were merged 
into one IFPRI–wide Discussion Paper series. The new series begins with number 00689, reflecting the prior publication of 688 
discussion papers within the dispersed series. The earlier series are available on IFPRI’s website at 
http://www.ifpri.org/publications/results/taxonomy%3A468. 
2 IFPRI Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results. They have been peer reviewed, but have not been 
subject to a formal external review via IFPRI’s Publications Review Committee. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion 
and critical comment; any opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the policies or opinions of 
IFPRI.
 
Copyright 2011 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this material may be reproduced for 
personal and not-for-profit use without the express written permission of but with acknowledgment to IFPRI. To reproduce the 
material contained herein for profit or commercial use requires express written permission. To obtain permission, contact the 
Communications Division at ifpri-copyright@cgiar.org. 
iii 
Contents 
Abstract  v 
Acknowledgments  vi 
Abbreviations and Acronyms  vii 
1.  Introduction  1 
2.  Trade Liberalization: Past Experience and Recent Trends  3 
3.  Key Trade Indicators  11 
4.  Methodological Approach  15 
5.  Results  19 
6.  Concluding Remarks  28 
Appendix: Supplementary Table  29 
References  37  
iv 
List of Tables 
1.    Development indicators, selected Latin American and Asian countries  14 
2.   Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Macroeconomic  
 variables, % scenario/baseline, 2020  20 
3.   Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Production in  
 volume, % scenario/baseline, 2020  20 
4.   Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries (Japan and South  
 Korea excluded): Production volume, % scenario/baseline, 2020  21 
5.   Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Wages, %  
scenario/baseline, 2020  22 
6.  Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Welfare, %  
scenario/baseline, 2020  23 
A.1. Trade arrangements between Latin American and Asian countries as of November 2010  29 
A.2. Bilateral investment treaties between Latin American and Asian countries  31 
A.3. Countries and regions included in simulations  32 
A.4. HS2 chapters 2007 nomenclature  32 
List of Figures 
1.   Regional trade agreements notified to the WTO, 1958–2010  4 
2.   Trade agreements: Asia, 1980–2010  5 
3.   Trade agreements: Latin America, 1980–2010  5 
4.   FTAs between Latin America and Asia as of November 2010  7 
5.   Asian RTA noodle bowl, 2009: Selected RTAs  8 
6.   Bilateral protection, average 1995–1998 and 2005–2008 (percent)  12 
7.   Investment decisions by households and firms  17 
8.   Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries (with and without 
developed Asian countries): Bilateral trade flows (in value at FOB prices), 2020  24 
9.   Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: FDI flows, % 
scenario/baseline, 2020  25 
10.  Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Real returns on  
capital, % scenario/baseline, 2020  26 
11.  Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Welfare, % 
scenario/baseline, 2020  27 
12.  Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries (without Japan and  
South Korea): FDI flows (no BITs), % scenario/baseline, 2020  27 
A.1. Share of Latin America in Asian exports (percent)  35 
A.2. Sectoral composition of Asia’s total exports and exports to Latin America (percent)  35 
A.3. Share of Asia in Latin America’s exports (percent)  36 
A.4. Sectoral composition of Latin America’s total exports and exports to Asia (percent)  36  
v 
ABSTRACT 
The last several years have seen an unprecedented cooperation in trade and investment between Asia and 
Latin America. Since 2003 an average of 2.2 regional trade agreements (RTAs)
* per year have been 
signed between countries of these two regions, and more RTAs are being negotiated. This is an important 
and relatively new phenomenon, considering that prior to 2003 there was virtually no bilateral RTA 
between these regions. In light of these trends, this study examines the potential impacts of a free trade 
agreement (FTA) between Latin America and Asia using the MIRAGE computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of the world economy. The analysis introduces three key modeling innovations: (1) a new 
way of modeling foreign direct investment (FDI), (2) a new tariff aggregator, and (3) incorporation of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in the model. These modeling improvements enable us to examine the 
potential impact of an FTA on FDI, a key aspect of economic relations between Asia and Latin America. 
The findings in this study show that an FTA between Asia and Latin America would bring benefits to 
most FTA members, although gains would be higher for Latin American countries as a result of increased 
investment inflows as well as increased exports to Asia under the FTA.  
Keywords: trade liberalization, FTA, Asia, Latin America, CGE modeling 
 
                                                       
* RTAs in this paper refer to both free trade agreements (FTAs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs).  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
During the last several years there has been an unprecedented cooperation in trade and investment 
between Asia and Latin America. Since 2003, an average of 2.2 regional trade agreements (RTAs)
1 per 
year have been signed between countries of these two regions, and the number is expected to increase as 
negotiations on seven other RTAs are under way. This is an important and relatively new phenomenon, 
considering that prior to 2003 there were virtually no bilateral RTAs between these regions.  
An important feature of RTAs between Asia and Latin America is that in addition to the usual 
coverage of trade in goods and services, the vast majority of them also cover the so-called Singapore 
issues, such as investment, government procurement, and competition policy. This is especially important 
because investment plays a key role in the economic relations of these two regions. In recent years, Asian 
countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea have been increasingly seeking investment opportunities 
in Latin America. China has emerged as a major investor, concentrating primarily on Latin American 
natural resources. Japan, on the other hand, invested roughly 8.7 percent ($39 billion)
2 of its outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) stock by the end of 2006 in the region’s finance, insurance, 
transportation, and manufacturing sectors (ECLAC 2008b).  
In addition to investing in Latin America, Asia has also become a key trading partner for Latin 
America, with China playing a key role. Between 1997 and 2007, Chinese trade with Latin America 
increased tenfold (up to $102 billion), making China the largest trading partner of the region after the 
United States (Ratlif 2008). On the other hand, Asian countries, especially China and India, represent 
major markets for some manufactures like automotives, electronics, cellular phones, and the like, in 
which several Latin American countries (such as Brazil and Mexico) are gaining comparative advantages 
(ECLAC 2008b). 
The deepening of trade relations between these two regions could have important implications for 
trade and investment flows because the regions exhibit quite different trade characteristics in terms of 
trade openness, protection structure, regionalization of trade, and specialization and structure of trade. 
While there is opportunity for future gains from further integration, it should be noted that trade between 
these two regions today is strongly intersectoral, with Latin America exporting mainly primary products 
to Asia and Asian countries sending high-tech manufactures to Latin America (ECLAC 2008b).  
In light of recent trends in trade and investment cooperation between these two regions, this study 
examines the potential impacts of a free trade agreement (FTA) between Latin America and Asia using 
the MIRAGE
3 computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy. The analysis is first 
conducted with the traditional version of the MIRAGE model, and then the results are compared with the 
new version of the MIRAGE model, which includes three key innovations: (1) a new way of modeling 
foreign direct investment (FDI), (2) a new tariff aggregator, and (3) the incorporation of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) in the model.  
While traditional modeling of RTAs focuses on static effects and usually concludes on meager 
gains from liberalization, recent improvements in the MIRAGE model allow us to examine the potential 
impact of an FTA on FDI, a key aspect of economic relations between Asia and Latin America. In the 
new version of MIRAGE, investment decisions of firms are distinguished from those of households. 
Firms keep a share of their profits to reinvest in their sector and choose only the location of their 
investments. In our modeling exercise, we also improve the way tariffs are aggregated, applying a 
consistent tariff aggregator. Finally, we also model the implementation of BITs. For calibration purposes, 
we use the database on bilateral FDI flows and stocks recently developed by Centre d'Etudes Prospectives 
et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII), France, which is documented by Boumellassa, Gouel, and 
Laborde (2007). 
The findings in this study show that an FTA between Asia and Latin America would benefit most 
                                                       
1 RTAs in this paper refer to both free trade agreements (FTAs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 
2 All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars. 
3 Modeling international relationships in applied general equilibrium.  
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FTA members, although gains would be higher for Latin American countries as a result of an increase in 
the investment inflows to the region as well as an increase in exports to Asia. Latin American exports 
would mainly increase in highly protected agrifood sectors, and as a consequence unskilled rural wages 
would increase, suggesting a potentially significant reduction in rural poverty. Asian exports to Latin 
America would increase in industrial sectors, reinforcing the current trade patterns between the two 
regions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the experience from 
past liberalization and recent liberalization trends in and between these two regions. This is followed by 
Section 3, which looks at key trade indicators for these two regions, including the level of protection they 
apply on imports and face on exports, product composition of their exports, and revealed comparative 
advantages. Section 4 provides the CGE analysis of the potential impact of an FTA between Asia and 
Latin America, including a description of the methodology used to conduct the analysis. Then Section 5 
provides the main results from our model and Section 6 concludes.  
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2.  TRADE LIBERALIZATION: PAST EXPERIENCE AND RECENT TRENDS 
Liberalization Experience in Asia and Latin America 
Both Asia and Latin America have gone through major economic and trade reforms, moving away from 
import substitution industrialization toward more open economic policies. Their experiences, however, 
differ for several reasons. First, reforms began in Asia much earlier than in Latin America. Some Asian 
countries began implementing basic reforms as early as the 1950s, and by the late 1980s most Asian 
economies had already moved away from import substitution to export orientation (James, Naya, and 
Meier 1989). On the other hand, Latin American countries introduced major reforms only toward the end 
of the 1980s, with the exception of Chile, which began implementing key reforms in 1973 and within less 
than a decade became one of the most open economies in the world (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis 1995). 
Second, in terms of trade policy, countries of both regions pursued unilateral liberalization, but 
their specific approaches differed. The approach of Latin America was a rapid and indiscriminate 
liberalization of imports (Agosin and Ffrench-Davis 1995). Asian economies, on the other hand, 
especially Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, pursued a more gradual and managed trade 
liberalization (Young 1996).  
Third, a crucial aspect of the liberalization process has also been the way in which these two 
regions managed their exchange rate policies. As Duran and Mulder (2008) observe, in Latin America 
trade liberalization took place in the context of real exchange rate appreciation. The introduction of fixed 
nominal exchange rate anchors to control inflation usually led to an overappreciation of the exchange rate 
in the midterm. In Asian countries such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam, on the other hand, the process of trade liberalization was accompanied by more competitive 
and less volatile real exchange rates (Duran and Mulder 2008).  
In addition to the above general characteristics that distinguish these two regions, it should be 
noted that even within the same region some countries followed different trade strategies. For example, 
south Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have been the most protective 
countries in Asia in terms of average tariffs that they have applied to imports (James, Naya, and Meier 
1989). They also pursued a strategy that was aimed at achieving industrial self-sufficiency through the 
implementation of various price-distortive policies, which in turn affected their industrial development 
(James, Naya, and Meier 1989). Their approach was generally more inward-looking, thus resembling 
more the trade strategy of Latin American countries rather than the outward-looking, export-oriented 
strategy followed by other Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
4  
Today, these two regions are experiencing a new wave of trade liberalization represented by a 
worldwide proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs). Out of 86 RTAs established between 2004 
and 2010 and notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 66 percent involve either an Asian or a 
Latin American country or both (see Figure 1). Two important trends have emerged from the recent 
worldwide increase in the number of RTAs. First, there is a growing number of RTAs between 
developing countries (south–south RTAs), and Asia and Latin America are leading the way in this trend. 
Second, these south–south RTAs are no longer purely intraregional as more developing and emerging 
economies are pursuing RTAs outside their respective regions. This is especially true in the case of Asian 
and Latin American countries, which have been actively pursuing bilateral RTAs with developing and 
developed countries, both within and outside their respective regions.  
                                                       
4 See James, Naya, and Meier (1989) for a comparison of the development performance of various Asian countries.   
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Figure 1. Regional trade agreements notified to the WTO, 1958–2010 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on WTO (n.d.) regional trade agreements information system data. 
Note:  LA: Latin America. 
While Figure 1 depicts RTAs notified to the WTO, Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide a more accurate 
picture of the existing RTAs in Asia and Latin America by including agreements that have not been 
notified to the WTO. This is especially important since numerous agreements that are signed among 
various countries are either not notified to the WTO or are notified several years after they have been 
signed. According to the database of Asian bilateral RTAs maintained by the Asian Development Bank’s 
Regional Integration Center (Asian Development Bank n.d.), there is a total of 108 bilateral or plurilateral 
RTAs established by Asian countries, one-third of which have not yet been notified to the WTO. In 
addition, according to the same database, as of November 2010, Asian countries are in the process of 
negotiating an additional 55 agreements; this does not include 46 agreements that have been proposed or 
are under study. Obviously, some of these proposed agreements may take a long time to be concluded or 
may never even materialize, but they are still an indication of a growing interest among countries to 
establish RTAs, especially as the multilateral trade negotiations under Doha stand in limbo.  
The key driver of bilateral RTAs within Asia is Japan, and to a lesser extent China and India. On 
the other hand, Asian cross-regional RTAs are primarily driven by Singapore’s bilateral agreements with 
developed economies (for example, European Free Trade Agreement [EFTA] countries, Australia, New 
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Figure 2. Trade agreements: Asia, 1980–2010 
. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Asian Development Bank (n.d.) Asia Regional Integration Center data. 
On the Latin American side, the number of RTAs reached 97 by November 2010
5 (Figure 3). 
About 43 percent of these agreements were established between 2003 and 2010; of these, 74 percent are 
cross-regional agreements. Before 2003, Latin America kept mostly to itself; in fact, with the exception of 
a handful of agreements (for example, NAFTA, Chile’s and Mexico’s bilateral agreements with the 
European Union and EFTA countries, Chile–Canada, and Costa Rica–Canada), all RTAs established 
before 2003 were among Latin American countries themselves (see Figure 3). Chile has been the key 
driver, accounting for almost one-third of all agreements signed by this region since 2003. After Chile, 
Peru follows with its focus on trade agreements with countries outside Latin America, including Canada, 
China, Singapore, the United States, and most recently South Korea.  
Figure 3. Trade agreements: Latin America, 1980–2010 
. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Organization of American States (n.d.), foreign trade information system (SICE). 
Note:  LA:  Latin America. 
                                                       






















































































































































































































































































































Trade and Investment Cooperation between Asia and Latin America 
In terms of economic cooperation between Asia and Latin America, a closer look at cross-regional 
agreements that countries of these two regions have signed since 2003 indicates the growing importance 
that these regions represent for each other. About 58 percent of all cross-regional agreements signed by 
Latin American countries are with Asian economies. Similarly, RTAs with Latin American countries 
represent 51 percent of all cross-regional agreements signed by Asian countries since 2003. Within the 
last eight years, an average of 2.2 agreements per year have been signed between Asian and Latin 
American countries, bringing the number of such agreements to 18 by November 2010
6 (see Table A.1 
and Figure 4). The last three years in particular have seen a surge in efforts to establish new bilateral trade 
agreements between Asia and Latin America; 10 out of 18 FTAs concluded between countries of these 
two regions have been signed between 2007 and 2010. This is an important and relatively new 
phenomenon, considering that prior to 2003 there were virtually no bilateral RTAs between countries of 
these two regions.  
In Latin America, this cross-regional cooperation is led by Chile and Peru, which have the 
greatest number of bilateral RTAs with Asian countries. To date, Chile has established RTAs with seven 
Asian countries (China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement [SEPA], which includes two Asian countries—Brunei and Singapore—as well as 
New Zealand) and is currently negotiating an RTA with Vietnam. Peru, on the other hand, has RTAs with 
three Asian countries (China, South Korea, and Singapore)—signed within the last two years—and 
launched negotiations with Japan in 2009. Peru also hopes to become a member of the Trans-Pacific 
SEPA.  
A distinguishing feature of RTAs between Asian and Latin American countries is that their scope 
goes beyond the traditional coverage of trade in goods. Most of these agreements also incorporate 
services and additional elements like the so-called Singapore issues, such as investment, government 
procurement, and competition policy. All RTAs, except the preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between 
India and Chile and between India and MERCOSUR (the Southern Cone Common Market), cover 
services. It should be noted, however, that many RTAs between Asian and Latin American countries 
provide limited coverage of financial services or exclude them altogether. Furthermore, all agreements 
exclude air transport services and in some cases cabotage in maritime transport (for example, Chile–India, 
Chile–Japan, and Mexico–Japan). Traditionally, air transport services have been negotiated through 
separate bilateral treaties, whereas foreign participation in cabotage in maritime transport is often deemed 
sensitive (Fink and Molinuevo 2008).  
The majority of agreements between Asian and Latin American countries incorporate provisions 
on promoting and protecting investment (see, for example, the Peru–China, Peru–Singapore, Panama–
Singapore, Chile–South Korea, Chile–Japan, and Mexico–Japan agreements as well as Taipei, China, 
agreements with Nicaragua, Panama, and Honduras and El Salvador). These provisions provide national 
and most-favored nation (MFN) treatment of investments with respect to establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale. They also address issues of expropriation and 
transfers. Many agreements also incorporate an ―investment and environment‖ article that discourages 
parties from relaxing environmental rules in order to attract investment and authorizes countries to take 
appropriate measures to ensure that investment activities are sensitive to environmental concerns (see, for 
example, Peru–Singapore, Chile–South Korea, Chile–Japan, and Mexico–Japan RTAs, and Taipei, China, 
agreements with Nicaragua, Panama, and Honduras and El Salvador). The Chile–China FTA currently 
does not address investment, but the two countries are in the process of negotiating an investment 
agreement. 
 
                                                       
6 In 2010 alone, four agreements were signed between countries of these two regions.   
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Figure 4. FTAs between Latin America and Asia as of November 2010 
 
In addition to investments, these agreements also cover government procurement, intellectual 
property rights, and competition policy (see, for example, Mexico–Japan, Chile–Japan, Chile–South 
Korea, and Trans-Pacific SEPA FTAs). A recent analysis of five selected bilateral FTAs between the two 
regions concluded that they represent an intraregional cooperation that is consistent with the WTO rules 
concerning WTO notification and agreement scope (Loewen 2009). Like most bilateral trade agreements, 
however, they also incorporate complex rules of origin that can hamper trade flows and increase the 
―noodle bowl‖ effect (see Figure 5) (Loewen 2009).  
In terms of tariff liberalization, the majority of RTAs between Asia and Latin America eliminate 
tariffs on more than 90 percent of bilateral trade within a 10-year period. As a result, it could be said that 
most agreements between Asia and Latin America take a gradual rather than immediate approach to 
liberalization. Some agreements, however, such as the Trans-Pacific SEPA and Singapore’s agreements 
with Peru and Panama, liberalize more than 90 percent of bilateral trade immediately upon 
Sources: Organization of American States (n.d.) foreign trade information system (SICE); UNESCAP (n.d.), the trade 
agreements database of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific; Asian Development 
Bank (n.d.), the free trade agreement database for Asia, of the Asia Regional Integration Center; various web-based news 
articles and updates, official government websites, and the like.  
  
8 
implementation. For example, Singapore offers immediate duty-free access to all products of Peru and 
Panama, whereas the latter countries provide immediate duty-free access to 87 percent and 98 percent of 
Singapore’s exports to these countries, respectively, and phase out liberalization for a number of goods 
over a period of 10 years. 
Gradual liberalization is generally a feature of south–south agreements. Wignaraja and Lazaro 
(2010) note, for example, that the Asia–Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), which has been in force since 
1976, covers far less than 50 percent of the tariff lines and is still on the fourth round of exchanges of 
tariff concessions.
7  
The proliferation of trade agreements can be a concerning factor due to their overlapping nature 
and other aspects, such as rules of origin that contribute to their complexity. Figure 5 depicts the complex 
web of agreements existing in Asian and Latin American regions.  
Figure 5. Asian RTA noodle bowl, 2009: Selected RTAs 
 
Source: Asia-PacificTrade and Investment Agreements Database (APTIAD)(n.d.). 
There is a growing cooperation in trade and investment between these two regions, although it 
still remains limited and is driven by a handful of countries. It is noteworthy that before 2004, there was 
no cross-regional bilateral trade agreement among developing countries notified to the WTO.  
The recent emergence of China as a major player in economic relations between Asia and Latin 
America is remarkable. Although China currently implements a free trade agreement only with Chile and 
Peru, Chinese trade with Latin America increased tenfold (up to $102 billion) between 1997 and 2007 
(Ratlif 2008), making China the largest trading partner of Latin America after the United States 
(MercoPress 2009); China supplanted the United States in 2009 as the main trade partner for both Brazil 
                                                       
7 Another example is the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA); see Bouet, Mevel, and Thomas 2010.  
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and Chile (Morton 2009). China’s presence in Latin America has also become prominent through its 
recent increase in lending and investment there, especially as the traditional lenders to the region have 
been dealing with the consequences of the 2007–2009 economic and financial crisis. In 2009, China 
became a donor member of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), committing $350 million to 
this institution’s program (Garr 2009). 
Chinese engagement in the region may be a reflection of the country’s interest in securing access 
to natural resources to fuel its economic growth, but the Latin American market is also a destination for 
exports of Chinese manufactures. Just recently, China signed an agreement with Brazil’s national energy 
company, Petrobras, lending it $10 billion in return for guaranteed oil supply over the next decade 
(Reuters 2009c). Another $10 billion deal with Argentina provides the latter country access to Chinese 
currency to pay for its imports from China. Furthermore, in 2009 China and Venezuela agreed to double 
the development fund in Venezuela from $6 billion to $12 billion; the deal also implies increasing oil 
shipments from Venezuela to China from 380,000 barrels a day to one million (Romero and Barrionuevo 
2009). The oil sector of Ecuador also represents a major investment area for China. In November 2009, 
China signed an oil-for-cash deal with Ecuador, ensuring a supply of 69 million barrels of oil during a 
two-year period from 2010 to 2012 in return for $1 billion in advance payment (Mapstone 2009). The two 
countries hope to embark on a $1.1 billion joint project to develop oil fields in Ecuador’s Amazon region 
(Reuters 2009b). According to a Chinese official, Beijing's total direct investment in Ecuador has reached 
$2.2 billion, while trade between the two countries reached $2.4 billion in 2008, a 50 percent increase 
from 2007 (Agence France-Presse 2009). The two countries have also been negotiating a lending deal of 
$1.7 billion so that Ecuador can build a hydroelectric plant. The deal has not yet been reached because 
Ecuador found Chinese conditions for the loan to be unacceptable (Agence France-Presse 2009). In 
addition, China’s third largest steelmaker recently bought a 21.5 percent stake in one of the iron ore mines 
of Brazil. The company also intends to make further investment in the steel industry through a joint 
venture in Brazil (Wheatley 2009). In Peru, China has already become a major investor, pouring in more 
than $5 billion, mainly in the mining sector (Reuters 2009a).  
Almost half of Chinese investments in 2006 went to Latin America. It should be noted, however, 
that most of these investments went to the tax haven territories of the Cayman Islands and the British 
Virgin Islands (ECLAC 2008b). Japan and South Korea have also made notable investments in Latin 
America. At the end of 2006, roughly 8.7 percent of Japan’s OFDI stock ($39 billion) was invested in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Unlike Chinese investments—which were concentrated mainly in 
natural resources—finance and insurance absorbed almost half the total Japanese investment in the 
region, followed by transportation services and manufacturing (ECLAC 2008b). Similarly, as of 2008, 
South Korea has invested about 7 percent of its OFDI stock in Latin America and the Caribbean. As with 
Chinese investments, major recipients of South Korean investments have been tax haven countries such 
as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands, and to a smaller extent Brazil (which 
absorbed 13 percent of the total invested), Peru (9 percent), and Mexico (9 percent). By sector, South 
Korean investments are concentrated in manufacturing (24 percent), mining (30 percent), agriculture and 
fishery (2 percent), and services and trade (44 percent) (ECLAC 2008b). 
A Japanese firm recently bought a 30 percent stake in a Chilean mining company, an investment 
of $1.3 billion. This reflects the fact that the FDI increase in Chile is concentrated mainly in the mining 
sector. Similarly, a consortium of Japanese and South Korean firms invested just over $3 billion in 2008, 
purchasing a 40 percent stake in a subsidiary of Brazilian steelmaker Compañía Siderúrgica Nacional 
(CSN) (ECLAC 2008a). Japanese and South Korean firms Sharp and Samsung, respectively, have also 
invested in the Mexican television industry aiming to strengthen Mexican competition in this area.  
On the Latin American side, Brazil is the country with the largest net flows of outward FDI. 
Recently, the Brazilian national energy company, Petrobras, signed an agreement to purchase 
ExxonMobil’s 87.5 percent stake in a refinery in Japan, which will allow Petrobras to commercialize 
biofuels in Japan and other Asian markets. A Brazilian manufacturer of bus bodies entered joint ventures 
in India and Egypt to produce buses for the Indian, African, European, and Middle Eastern markets. Latin 
America’s largest mining enterprise, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, has invested $410 million in a  
10 
hydroelectric plant in Indonesia (ECLAC 2008a).  
While Asian countries represent a great opportunity for Latin American countries to diversify 
their trading partners, the economic links between the two regions generally remain weak and show little 
diversification (ECLAC 2008b). The two regions lack a coordinated strategy to strengthen trade and 
investment ties between them (ECLAC 2008b). In addition, there are certain barriers that may affect the 
cooperation between the two regions, such as high effective tariffs in agriculture and natural resources 
based in the Asia–Pacific region, high transport costs in Latin America, the education gap between the 
two regions, and the like. (Medalla and Balboa 2009). In terms of investments, it should be noted that the 
nationalization process and threats directed to transnational firms may discourage such firms from 
investing in the region (ECLAC 2008a).   
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3.  KEY TRADE INDICATORS 
While trade cooperation between Asia and Latin America has increased in recent years, the trade 
relationship between the two regions is still highly asymmetrical. Although Asia is becoming an 
increasingly important trading partner for Latin America, Latin America does not represent the same level 
of importance for Asian countries (ECLAC 2008b). Indeed, the share of total Asian exports to Latin 
America was only 1.75 percent in 2007, while in the same year about 22 percent of all Latin American 
exports went to Asian markets
8 (see Figures A.1–A.4). The interregional relationship is characterized by 
low intra-industry trade; Latin American countries export mainly primary products to Asia while Asian 
countries export high-tech manufactures to Latin America (Medalla and Balboa 2009).  
These two regions differ from one another on several key trade and development indicators. First, 
in terms of regional integration, intraregional trade is stronger in Asia than in Latin America. In the last 
20 years, for example, intra-Asian exports made up 40 percent of total exports, while in the case of Latin 
America, the share of intraregional exports in total exports reached 30 percent by the end of the 1990s and 
has decreased ever since. In the case of imports, the figures are even more contrasting: While 
intraregional imports were 55 percent of all Asian imports in 2007, the intraregional share in Latin 
American imports was only 30 percent.  
Second, trade specialization is another factor that distinguishes these two regions. Latin American 
countries are specialized in agricultural and other primary products, resulting in an intersectoral trade 
pattern; in other words, the region exports mainly agricultural and primary products and imports 
manufactures. On the other hand, in Asia manufactures represent the bulk of both exports and imports, 
leading to an intrasectoral trade pattern.
9 It is noteworthy that during the last several years this trend has 
deepened in Asia, while the trade patterns in Latin America have remained more or less the same. Trade 
specialization of these two regions is consistent with their respective comparative advantage: The 
majority of countries in Latin America have a comparative advantage in agricultural products, whereas 
the comparative advantage of most Asian economies lies in industrial products such as textiles and 
wearing apparel.  
Third, Asia and Latin America also differ in terms of the level and structure of protection that 
they apply to imports. On one hand, Latin America applies a relatively low and homogenous protection 
across sectors. On the other hand, some Asian countries still maintain high tariffs in agriculture while 
having opened their industrial sectors to benefit from international division of labor. This means the 
protection that these two regions face when exporting to one another is asymmetrical. In other words, the 
key Latin American exports to Asia face higher tariffs on average than the main Asian exports to Latin 
America. This is true even though Asia has significantly reduced the protection applied to agricultural 
exports, especially those coming from Latin America, between 1995–1998 and 2005–2008 (see Figure 6).  
                                                       
8 All statistics in this section have been calculated based on the Base pour l'Analyse du Commerce International (BACI) 
database developed by CEPII. 
9 Manufactures represented 74 percent of Asian imports and 75 percent of Asian exports in 2007, while in Latin America 
these figures were 72 percent and 43 percent, respectively, in the same year.   
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Figure 6. Bilateral protection, average 1995–1998 and 2005–2008 (percent) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MAcMap-Hs6 V2, reference group weights. 
Note: LAC: Latin American countries.  
Nevertheless, while the applied protection in agriculture has fallen in these two regions, support 
for agriculture has been increasing. For example, Anderson and Martin (2009) note an upward trend of 
support to import-competing agriculture in Asia. In southeast Asia, for example, farmers were taxed more 
than $100 billion per year in the early 1980s (over $200 per person working in agriculture), but now they 
receive support amounting to over $30 per person employed on farms in China and $70 in southeast Asia 
(Anderson and Martin 2009). Similarly, south Asia countries like India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka all 
provide input subsidies to farmers. 
Similarly, in Latin America, Anderson and Valdés (2009) note the emergence of positive 
assistance for agriculture in Latin America since the 1990s. Instead of being taxed nearly $17 billion a 
year as in the 1980s, now farmers in Latin America receive support of more than $5 billion a year (nearly 
$150 per person employed on farms) (Anderson and Valdés 2009). 
The fourth aspect that distinguishes these two regions from one another is the level of protection 
they face at the global level. Many countries in Latin America face a relatively high level of protection on 
exports, especially Guyana, Uruguay, and Nicaragua. For these countries, exports are concentrated in a 
few agricultural products like rice (Guyana, Uruguay), sugar (Guyana), meat and dairy products 
(Uruguay), or textiles and apparel (Nicaragua), products that are highly protected worldwide. On the other 
hand, Asian countries face lower protection on their exports because they export more manufacturing 
products, the worldwide protection on which has declined considerably as a result of the Uruguay Round.  
This is in line with the overall trends in exports of these two regions. Asian exports are 
concentrated in industrial goods; the share of industrial exports in total exports has hovered around 90 
percent within the last 15 years. The share of Latin American exports of both agricultural and industrial 
goods, in total exports of the region, has declined over the last decade (reaching 26 percent and 43 percent 
respectively in 2007), while exports of primary products have increased over the last several years. Both 
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According to the data, there is potential for trade complementarity between the two regions.
10 
This is especially true for Asian exports to Latin America, which currently represent only 2 percent of 
total Asian exports and have a lower share of industrial goods than do total Asian exports. Latin American 
exports to Asia also differ qualitatively from total Latin American exports, with the former having a 
higher share of industrial and agricultural products. The prospects for trade gains from a free trade 
agreement between these two regions appear to be good for both sides and especially for Asia as far as its 
potential for increasing its industrial exports to Latin America. 
Before turning to the FTA simulations designed in this study, it is important to look briefly at 
how these two regions fare in terms of development indicators such as income, poverty, and inequality. 
The first observation here is that there is a great diversity in the performance of various countries within 
each region on the above indicators (see Table 1). While Latin America, for example, appears to be better 
off than Asia in terms of per capita income, which in most countries is above $6,000 with poor accounting 
for less than 10 percent of the population, there are some Latin American countries that perform much 
worse than the average, such as Haiti, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and to a lesser extent, Honduras. On average, 
however, the growth of GDP per capita in Asian countries is higher than in Latin American countries, 
reflecting high growth rates in Cambodia, China, and India. In addition, some Asian countries like China 
and Pakistan have experienced significant reduction in poverty, a domain in which Latin America has 
made little or no progress. Latin America is characterized by higher inequality than is Asia, where country 
Gini coefficients are below 50. In Asia, the most successful experiences in terms of development 
indicators are Malaysia, Thailand, and China, which has substantially increased its per capita income and 
reduced poverty in the last 20 years.  
   
                                                       
10 The trade complementarity index measures the extent to which the exports of one region match the import pattern of the 
other region. It is defined as the sum of the absolute value of the difference between the import category shares and the export 
shares of the partners, divided by two. The index takes values between 0 and 100, with 0 indicating no complementarity and 100 
indicating a perfect match in the import/export pattern (ESCAP 2007). For 2007, the index takes a value of 68.3 for Asian exports 
to Latin America and 58.2 for Latin American exports to Asia.   
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Argentina  8,464  10,896  <5  <5  2.0  5.4  47.6  49.9 
Bolivia  2,857  3,667  15.4  11.3  18.9  19.6  55.6  50.5 
Brazil  6,655  8,667  7.3  <5  11.3  8.9  58.7  56.5 
Chile  8,186  12,254  <5  <5  2.0  2.0  54.9  - 
Colombia  5,276  6,780  9.1  5.7  12.4  16.0  57.3  55.8 
Costa Rica  5,759  8,846  <5  <5  5.8  2.4  46.3  48.1 
Dominican Republic  4,277  6,653  14  9.3  6.3  4.5  49.7  51.3 
Ecuador  4,715  6,599  13.1  7.8  -  9.8  51.4  56.6 
El Salvador  4,454  6,394  8.7  6.2  13.6  11.0  51.3  48.4 
Haiti  1,089  1,196  33.6  28.2  -  -  -  - 
Honduras  2,768  3,604  13.5  7.7  15.6  20.2  54.9  55.4 
Nicaragua  1,837  2,416  23.4  10.5  -  15.8  -  - 
Paraguay  3,474  3,968  7.6  5.6  12.7  9.3  56.2  54.6 
Peru  4,644  6,522  14.9  7.3  8.6  8.1  49  47.6 
Uruguay  7,478  9,635  -  <5  2.0  2.0  43.1  45.6 
Venezuela  8,515  10,026  6.6  6.1  11.2  6.8  50.3  46.5 
Bangladesh  694  1,137  35.9  24.7  59.4  49.6  39  33.7 
Cambodia  678  1,451  31.7  21.2  -  40.2  44.2  41.7 
China  1,681  4,113  11.6  5.7  36.4  15.9  30.6  46.9 
India  1,158  2,091  31.7  23.9  -  41.6  32.8  36.8 
Indonesia  2,429  3,220  19.7  14.8  -  21.4  35  39.4 
Malaysia  8,184  11,663  8.8  <5  2.0  2.0  49.2  40.3 
Nepal  678  967  27.6  19.8  68.4  55.1  46.6  47.2 
Pakistan  1,604  2,238  24.7  21  48.1  22.6  29.9  31.2 
Philippines  2,085  2,943  19  13.2  21.6  22.6  47.2  - 
Sri Lanka  2,245  3,580  21.1  13.7  16.3  -  41.4  - 
Thailand  4,897  6,866  16.4  8.2  2.0  2.0  49.2  - 
Vietnam  1,105  2,152  24.8  11.9  -  22.8  36.7  34.4 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (2009), von Grebmer et al. (2009), World Development Indicators (World Bank), and 
World Institute for Development Economics Research - United Nations University (n.d.). 
Notes: GDP: gross domestic product; PPP: purchasing power parity. Hunger Index ranks 84 developing countries using three 
equally weighted indicators: (1) the proportion of people who are calorie deficient, (2) the prevalence of underweight in children 
under the age of five, and (3) the under-five mortality rate (von Grebmer et al., 2009). Poverty headcount is the percentage of 
population living on $1.25 per day or less. The Gini coefficient measures the inequality in income distribution in a country or 
region; it takes values between 0 and 100, 0 being a perfectly equal distribution of income and 100 a perfectly unequal 
distribution of income.  
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4.  METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
This section describes the methodology adopted in this study to evaluate the consequences of trade 
integration between Asian and Latin American countries, with the idea that this kind of agreement could 
have important implications for both trade flows and foreign investment. We start with a snapshot of the 
MIRAGE model of the world economy and a description of the special tariff aggregation used in this 
modeling exercise. This is followed by a detailed description of the modeling framework for investment 
and FDI and the baseline designed for this study. Finally, we present the scenarios that are evaluated in 
this study. 
The MIRAGE Model of the World Economy 
Mirage is a multicountry, multisector computable general equilibrium model of the world economy. In 
each country, a representative consumer maximizes a CES–LES (constant elasticity of substitution–linear 
expenditure system) utility function under a budget constraint to allocate his or her income across goods. 
The origin of goods is determined by a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) nested structure following 
the Armington (1969) assumption.
11 In addition, northern countries are assumed to produce higher-quality 
industrial goods than southern countries. On the production side, value-added and intermediate goods are 
complements under a Leontief hypothesis. The value-added is a CES function of unskilled labor and a 
composite of skilled labor and capital; this allows for including less substitutability between the last two 
production factors. In agriculture and mining, production also depends on land and natural resources. 
New capital is perfectly mobile across sectors while installed capital is immobile. Skilled labor is 
perfectly mobile across sectors while unskilled labor is imperfectly mobile between agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors. Total employment is constant. Investment is savings-driven and the real exchange 
rate adjusts freely to maintain the current account surplus or deficit of each country constant as a share of 
world gross domestic product (GDP). This implies that the level of over- or undervaluation of each 
currency remains constant.
12 This last assumption is important in this study since tariff reductions will 
have positively correlated impacts on both imports and exports for every country. In this paper, we 
introduce three innovations over the standard version of the MIRAGE model. First, we work with a 
different tariff aggregator. Second, we introduce modifications in the way we model FDI. Third, we also 
introduce the modeling of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  
Tariff Aggregation 
Historically, in order to introduce tariffs in CGE models, measures such as simple or trade-weighted 
average tariffs have been employed, but they lack theoretical foundation and may introduce significant 
biases in estimation. The most obvious problem with the trade-weighted average is that the weight on any 
tariff declines as the average rises, with very high tariffs having vanishingly small weights even when 
their trade-distorting impacts may be large. More recently, new approaches with rigorous theoretical 
foundations for the aggregation problem have emerged. Anderson and Neary (1994) proposed a uniform 
tariff that yields the same welfare as the original differentiated tariff structure. In their subsequent work 
(1996, 2003, 2005), they developed uniform tariff measures that are equivalent in their effects on the 
value of exports. The unifying feature of these aggregators is that they return the uniform tariff rate that 
yields the same value of a specific objective function as the actual, nonuniform tariffs. Using an atheoretic 
                                                       
11 The MIRAGE model is based on GTAP Armington elasticities, which are low compared to those used in other models 
(the World Bank’s LINKAGE model, for example).  
12 We do not include in our scenario any reduction of exchange rate misalignments since that would constitute a 
supplementary shock that would drastically change the impact of the trade agreements that we study. It would be possible to 
include a modification of these misalignments in both the scenario and the baseline, but that would marginally affect the 
difference between the two.  
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approach, the MAcMap-HS6 methodology (Bouet et al. 2008) proposes to use an instrumental variable, 
the imports of a reference group, to reduce the endogeneity bias of protection at the bilateral level.  
Building on the Anderson-Neary approach, Bach, Martin, and Stevens (1996) and Bach and 
Martin (2001) proposed an approach to tariff aggregation in the context of structural economic models 
that would mitigate many of the problems resulting from the use of atheoretic aggregators—and showed 
that the implications of aggregation could be large for specific countries. However, they were able to 
apply their approach only to individual countries or regions. In a single-country model, a different tariff 
aggregator can be introduced into the expenditure and tariff revenue functions and used to solve for the 
welfare impacts of changes in tariffs. When this is done in a global model, however, a major difficulty 
arises because Walras’ Law is no longer satisfied at the global level. When, for instance, a reduction in a 
particularly high tariff in one country results in a more rapid decline in expenditures than in tariff 
revenues, the country experiences a gain in welfare without there being any corresponding increase in 
income elsewhere. Anderson (2009) resolved this problem ingeniously by recognizing that the quantity 
indexes at domestic prices are different from quantity indexes at world prices. To take account of this, 
Anderson notes that expenditure on aggregate good j at domestic prices must equal expenditure on the 
good at border prices plus the value of the tariff. In this paper, we implement the idea of Anderson (2009) 
using the methodology proposed by Laborde (2008) and already applied by Laborde, Martin, and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2009).  
Therefore, each tariff scenario implemented at the HS6 level on a bilateral basis is translated into 
two parameters that will be used in the model: (1) a trade-weighted average (using ex post weights) to 
capture the right tariff revenue aggregator and (2) the true price index of the imports to have an 
expenditure-consistent aggregator and capture the quantity wedge at world and domestic prices. We 
report results using this tariff aggregator and the traditional trade-weighted average one. We should 
expect smaller gains from liberalization when we introduce the latter, as it tends to underestimate high 
peaks in tariff structure.  
Investment and Foreign Direct Investment 
The way in which FDI is modeled in this study differs significantly from the usual MIRAGE FDI 
framework. In contrast to the standard framework of MIRAGE, and following Laborde and Lakatos 
(2009), we assume that households and firms invest with different behaviors. In the standard version of 
MIRAGE, all firm profits are given to the household, which invests its savings across sectors and 
countries based on its preferences (calibrated on existing investment patterns) and the evolution of real 
return on investment. In this paper’s approach, we maintain this household behavior unchanged, but we 
assume that firms keep a share of their profits to reinvest in their own sector, being able to choose only 
the location of their investments. These two behaviors are designed to mimic the difference between 
portfolio investments and FDI, as shown in Figure 7.   
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Figure 7. Investment decisions by households and firms 
Household  Firms 
   
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
In dynamics, the most profitable sectors will invest more in themselves and will focus on 
optimizing the location of their investments. On the other hand, declining sectors will have fewer 
resources of their own, and since households will not invest in them either, they will shrink.  
The data on bilateral FDI flows and stocks employed in our modeling exercise has been built by 
CEPII (France) and is documented by Boumellassa, Gouel, and Laborde (2007). In contrast to other data 
sources, this database is fully consistent, balanced, and suitable for use in a CGE framework. It is 
designed to be compatible with the GTAP 7 database.  
FTAs are assumed to foster FDI among participants, through a ―mechanical‖ link between FDI 
and trade as well as through an important institutional component. The trust of the investors is reinforced 
by the strong commitments of the countries in the FTA to liberalize trade (and therefore to secure trade 
channels for the future), to harmonize some rules, and in most of the cases, to consider legal solutions for 
dealing with disputes. In addition, most FTAs involve several dispositions concerning FDI and lead to the 
implementation or reinforcement of BITs.  
In this paper, we consider the implementation of BITs between countries of each region as 
complementary to the implementation of the FTA between the regions.
13 To simulate this type of 
agreement, we introduce a shifter in the preference parameters of the investment function of both firms 
and households. The shifter is calibrated based on the estimated effects of BITs in gravity literature 
explaining FDI (Bittencourt, Domingo, and Reig 2006). Ceteris paribus, bilateral investment flows are 
multiplied by the exponential of the coefficient in the BIT dummy when BITs are implemented in 
comparison to the reference situation (no BIT). Concretely, we shock the preference parameter to 
obtaining, ceteris paribus, the desired evolution of the share pattern. Simulations will be performed with 
and without this effect to assess the robustness of our results.  
                                                       
13 If several countries have already enforced BITs, the FTA scenario will not have direct effects on their FDI pattern. 
However, they may suffer negative consequences through FDI dilution effect (countries with new BTIs become more attractive 
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A baseline is implemented from 2008 to 2020, which depicts the world without a new multilateral 
agreement.
 In the baseline, we also implement main trade policy changes since 2004, such as ongoing 
WTO accession commitments, including those of the most recent members (for example, Ukraine, Cape 
Verde, and Vietnam); the updated Japanese GSP (generalized system of preferences) scheme in favor of 
least developed countries; modified bound tariffs on European Union (EU) poultry; the EU enlargement 
to Romania and Bulgaria in 2007; and the end of the EU EBA (everything but arms) regime for protocol 
products (sugar, bananas, and rice), and regional agreements such as the South Asian Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA). However, we do not include agreements under negotiation (for example, EU–India) 
or the India–ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) FTA. In addition, we do not implement a 
wide FTA inside each region in the scenario or in the baseline.  
This baseline serves as a point of comparison with all scenarios. The results are reported for year 
2020. Results are presented as the percentage difference between the baseline and the scenario for a 
certain macroeconomic variable in 2020. The analysis does not account for the surge in world prices of 
energy and food products between 2004 and 2008. However, exogenous increases in active populations 
are included in the model and each country’s global factor productivity is affected such that GDP 
evolution, as described by the model, corresponds to the World Bank’s GDP predictions.  
Scenario Design 
We focus on two simple trade scenarios:  
1.  A complete free trade area between Asia and Latin America (see list of countries in each 
group in Table A.3) is implemented between 2010 and 2014; 
2.  A complete free trade area between the two regions is implemented (as above), excluding the 
most developed Asian economies (namely Japan and South Korea), since these two countries 
are the only Asian countries in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development), and FTAs between high-income countries and middle-income countries are 
still uncommon.  
These two scenarios are run first with the traditional version of MIRAGE (TTA) and then 
introducing the following changes in steps: (1) change in the consistent tariff aggregator (designated as 
CTA), (2) change in FDI framework (designated as FDI), (3) change in shifter parameter to consider the 
implementation of BITs (designated as BIT).  
Using the highly disaggregated information (5,113 products and more than 160 countries) of the 
MAcMap-HS6 version 2 (Boumellassa, Laborde, and Mitaritonna 2009), we compute the evolution of the 
trade-weighted average tariff—but with endogenous trade weights—to have the correct tariff revenue 
aggregator and the true price index of imports at domestic prices (the correct expenditures aggregator) at 
the aggregation level of the model. We assume CES preferences across HS6 products belonging to one 
aggregated sector in the model, with an elasticity of substitution of 2. The latter value is a conservative 
assumption, and the lack of relevant econometric estimates makes it difficult to choose higher values on a 
robust ground, knowing that welfare effects increase significantly with the value of this parameter. 
Therefore, we can consider our estimates as a lower bound (see Laborde, Martin, and van der 
Mensbrugghe 2009 for a discussion of this parameter and sensitivity analysis).  
It is important to emphasize that we do not include ―exceptions‖ or sensitive products that will 
not be liberalized in the FTA design. Similarly, all tariffs are eliminated on goods and we do not consider 
the implementation of tariff rate quotas. Therefore, our assessment focuses on the maximum potential 
trade and welfare effects of trade liberalization between the two regions.   
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5.  RESULTS 
The introduction of a few key innovations in the model makes a difference in terms of the amount and 
quality of information we obtain on the impacts of a potential FTA between Asia and Latin America. This 
section provides two sets of results. The first set comes from using the traditional version of the MIRAGE 
model (TTA) the second set from using the new, improved version of MIRAGE, which includes three 
new features: (1) a new tariff aggregator, (2) a new way of modeling the foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and (3) modeling of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  
Results Obtained through the Traditional Version of MIRAGE 
Table 2 through Table 5 present results of two scenarios designed in this study: (1) a free trade agreement 
(FTA) between countries of Latin America and of Asia, and (2) an FTA between countries of Latin 
America and of Asia, excluding developed Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea.  
Note that the results in this section come from the traditional version of MIRAGE, which means 
that they do not include the three new modeling features mentioned above. The interpretation of results 
focuses on the impact of the two FTA scenarios on real income, exports, production, and unskilled real 
wages. Table 2 presents the impact of the first scenario, namely the FTA between Latin America and 
Asia, on macrovariables. While most countries benefit from the agreement, some countries or subregions 
do not benefit; the latter include Andean countries, Central America, and Venezuela on the Latin 
American side and India, south Asia, and ASEAN countries on the Asian side.  
Unsurprisingly, some countries experience real income losses, which may be explained by trade 
deflection effects being greater than trade creation effects (see Viner 1950). Indeed these regions are hurt 
by deterioration of terms of trade. Under the agreement, Latin American countries import substantially 
more from Japan, South Korea, and China and less from their Latin American partners—especially 
MERCOSUR and Chile—as well as third trade partners such as NAFTA countries and European 
countries. For example, Venezuela and Andean countries experience increases in imports from Japan by 
118 percent and 57 percent respectively, from South Korea by 101 percent and 75 percent respectively, 
and from China by 99 percent and 79 percent respectively. Asian countries also see significant increases 
on imports from all Latin American countries, especially from Argentina, Brazil, and the Andean 
countries, reducing imports from all other origins. 
Welfare gains from the agreement are greater for Latin American countries than for Asia, with 
substantial gains for Argentina (0.7 percent), Chile (1.2 percent), and the rest of MERCOSUR (Paraguay 
and Uruguay: 2.6 percent). In addition, export volume increases substantially in the case of Central 
America (10.4 percent), Brazil 7.8 percent), the rest of MERCOSUR (6.4 percent), and Andean countries 
(6.2 percent). It is important to note that the highest increase in exports in these countries comes in those 
sectors for which markets are virtually closed in some Asian countries in the reference year. This is the 
case of exports of rice from Brazil to Japan, oilseeds from the rest of MERCOSUR and Andean countries 
to South Korea, and sugar from most Latin American countries to Japan. As far as Asian countries are 
concerned, the region that benefits most is central Asia, with increases of 1.3 percent and 3.3 percent in 
welfare and exports, respectively. All other Asian economies also increase their exports, but to a much 
lower extent than do Latin American countries.  
The impact on exports from other regions that do not participate in the agreement is, as expected, 
negative, although this result does not have a significant negative effect on welfare. The nonparticipant 
regions that experience the greatest negative effects are NAFTA countries, with a 0.5 percent fall in 
exports, and Sub-Saharan Africa, with the highest fall in welfare (-0.04 percent) and in real GDP (-0.02 
percent).  
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Table 2. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: 
Macroeconomic variables, % scenario/baseline, 2020 







trade  Welfare 
Andean countries  Latin America   6.4  0.20  -0.81  -0.11 
Argentina  Latin America  5.5  0.49  1.17  0.67 
Brazil  Latin America  8.4  0.26  0.52  0.27 
Central America  Latin America  10.8  0.18  -1.26  -0.21 
Chile  Latin America  4.5  0.65  1.39  1.20 
Rest of MERCOSUR  Latin America  10.4  1.62  3.13  2.60 
Venezuela  Latin America  2.3  0.02  -0.66  -0.31 
ASEAN  Asia  0.6  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
Central Asia  Asia  3.3  0.58  1.52  1.31 
China  Asia  0.8  0.02  0.07  0.04 
Hong Kong and Singapore  Asia  0.1  0.00  0.02  0.03 
India  Asia  2.7  0.02  -0.37  -0.01 
Japan  Asia  0.9  0.06  0.01  0.03 
South Asia  Asia  1.0  -0.02  -0.08  -0.02 
South Korea  Asia  0.6  0.08  0.11  0.16 
Source: MIRAGE and authors’ calculations. 
Table 3 shows the effects of the agreement on production volume of agrifood products, industrial 
products, and services. Unsurprisingly, the FTA between Latin America and Asia reinforces production 
specialization of Latin American countries in agrifood sectors and Asian production specialization in 
industry.  
Table 3. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Production in 
volume, % scenario/baseline, 2020  






America  China  ASEAN  India  Japan 
South 
Asia 
Agrifood  4.91   6.67   3.37   1.02   0.48   -0.17   -0.44   -1.24   -1.83   -0.39  
Industry  -1.59   -2.48   -0.50   -1.70   0.27   0.13   0.38   0.72   0.35   0.53  
Services  0.38   0.09   0.18   0.15   -0.02   -0.00   -0.11   -0.15   -0.03   -0.07  
Source: MIRAGE and authors’ calculations. 
The FTA benefits those sectors in which each region has a comparative advantage: agriculture in 
Latin America and manufacturing in Asia. The increase in real value-added is substantial in the case of 
agrifood in Brazil (rice 119 percent, beverages and tobacco 25.7 percent, and sugar 23.5 percent), 
Argentina (rice 21.8 percent, vegetable oils 18.6 percent, and oilseeds 16.9 percent), and the rest of 
MERCOSUR (oilseeds 47.9 percent and sugar 19.1 percent). On the other hand, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
and Andean countries experience a significant decline in industrial production, which could make the 
agreement a politically sensitive issue. In Asian countries, value-added in industry increases mainly for  
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textiles (ASEAN +1.2 percent and south Asia +1.1 percent), wearing apparel (India +3 percent, south 
Asia + 1.1 percent, and ASEAN 1.1 percent), and leather (India +1.9 percent).  
The second scenario involving the same FTA between Latin America and Asia as described 
above, but without developed Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, produces similar results. 
This time, however, real income gains for Argentina, Brazil, and MERCOSUR are more moderate as 
compared to the previous scenario since these countries no longer benefit from improved access to 
Japanese and South Korean markets as they did in the previous scenario. On the other hand, some big 
Asian economies, such as ASEAN and China, benefit from the fact that developed countries are not part 
of the FTA: They gain from increased access to Latin American markets without having to compete with 
Japan and South Korea. As a result, Chinese and ASEAN exports to Latin America increase by more than 
50 percent compared to a less than 2 percent increase or even a decline of their exports to Latin America 
when Japan and South Korea are part of the agreement.  
In Table 4 we see that when excluding Japan and South Korea, the pattern of specialization is 
similar to but not as strong as when these two countries are part of the agreement (compare figures for 
Argentina, Brazil, and the rest of MERCOSUR in Table 3 and Table 4). In the case of the rest of 
MERCOSUR (Paraguay and Uruguay), the impact on industrial production is now positive, which could 
potentially make the agreement more desirable and less sensitive politically. Excluding Japan and South 
Korea from the agreement annuls any production effect on these countries and does not alter production 
specialization of the rest of Asian countries, which still increase their industrial production.  
Table 4. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries (Japan and 
South Korea excluded): Production volume, % scenario/baseline, 2020 






America  China  ASEAN  India  Japan 
South 
Asia 
Agrifood  4.43   4.46   0.85   0.55   -0.04   -0.11   -0.14   -1.22   -0.01   -0.39  
Industry  -1.46   -1.63   2.73   -1.12   0.06   0.13   0.33   0.73   -0.02   0.57  
Services  0.36   0.07   -0.05   0.06   0.00   0.01   -0.09   -0.15   -0.00   -0.07  
Source: MIRAGE and authors’ calculations. 
The expansion of the agrifood sector in Latin America leads to an increase of unskilled real 
wages, especially in agriculture, as Table 5 shows. This increase is higher when Japan and South Korea 
are part of the agreement and, again, MERCOSUR and Chile are the main beneficiaries. For most Asian 
countries, on the other hand, unskilled wages in the agriculture sector fall, as a consequence of these 
countries’ specialization in industrial sectors. Given that poverty in Latin America is concentrated in rural 
areas (according to ECLAC 2008a) estimates, in 2008, 52.2 percent of rural population was poor versus 
27.6 percent of urban population), an increase in wages for the agricultural sector may contribute to a 
reduction of poverty in this region. Rural poverty is also higher in most Asian countries (World Bank 
n.d.), and thus the specialization in manufacturing and the consequent fall in agricultural wages do not 
contribute to a reduction of poverty in this region.  
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Table 5. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Wages, % 
scenario/baseline, 2020 
Country  Region 















Andean countries  Latin America  -0.1  0.3  2.5  -0.2  -0.0  0.7 
Argentina  Latin America  0.6  1.1  6.3  0.5  1.0  5.6 
Brazil  Latin America  0.1  0.6  9.7  0.1  0.3  5.5 
Central America  Latin America  0.9  1.2  2.4  0.7  0.8  0.9 
Chile  Latin America  1.1  2.1  16.5  0.2  0.4  2.0 
Rest of MERCOSUR  Latin America  1.8  5.2  16.6  1.1  2.0  4.8 
Venezuela  Latin America  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3 
ASEAN  Asia  0.1  0.0  -0.6  0.2  0.1  -0.4 
Central Asia  Asia  0.4  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.2  0.1 
China  Asia  0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.0 
Hong Kong and 
Singapore  Asia  0.0  0.0  -0.3  -0.0  -0.0  -0.2 
India  Asia  0.2  0.0  -0.8  0.2  0.0  -0.8 
Japan  Asia  0.2  0.1  -4.6  -0.0  -0.0  -0.1 
South Asia  Asia  0.0  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.2 
South Korea  Asia  0.3  0.3  -0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.0 
Source: MIRAGE and authors’ calculations. 
Results Obtained through the New Version of MIRAGE 
The improved version of MIRAGE, which includes three innovative features, alters the outcome 
(discussed in the preceding subsection) of the two policy scenarios discussed in the preceding section—
the FTA between Latin America and Asia, and the FTA between these two regions without South Korea 
and Japan. Table 6 and Figure 8 illustrate the impact of the FTA between Latin America and Asia on 
welfare and trade when the analysis is done employing the improved model with the three new features: 
(1) changing the tariff aggregator (designated as CTA), (2) changing the FDI modeling framework 
(designated as CTA + FDI), and (3) modeling bilateral trade agreements between both regions 
(designated as CTA + FDI + BIT).  
As with any trade policy assessment, the results presented in the previous section, based on the 
traditional version of MIRAGE (TTA), are sensitive to the tariff aggregator considered. When we 
introduce the consistent tariff aggregator described in section 0, gains for most countries that are part of 
the FTA are higher, except in certain cases, such as Chile and, to a lesser extent, the rest of MERCOSUR, 
which originally exhibit a more homogenous protection structure. As previously discussed, the average 
tariff tends to be higher when applying the consistent tariff aggregator as compared to applying the 
traditional trade-weighted average, especially when the original tariff structure is characterized by a high 
variance. This explains why Brazil and Central America have higher gains from liberalization with the 
new tariff aggregator, while Chile and the rest of MERCOSUR have lower gains from liberalization and 
suffer from stronger preference erosion mechanisms. Among Asian countries, the new tariff aggregator 
more than doubles welfare gains for South Korea, which has the highest welfare increase as compared to 
the outcome under the traditional version of MIRAGE. These gains can also be attributed to South  
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Korea’s dispersed tariff structure before the agreement. The higher average tariff among countries 
participating in the agreement explains the higher increase in bilateral trade flows when we change the 
tariff aggregator in the model (see Figure 8 ).  
Table 6. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Welfare, % 
scenario/baseline, 2020 
Country  Region  TTA  CTA  CTA + FDI  CTA + FDI + BIT 
All  Latin America  0.20  0.51  0.52  0.68 
All  Asia  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.06 
Andean countries  Latin America  -0.11  -0.06  -0.02  0.14 
Argentina  Latin America  0.67  0.90  0.95  1.23 
Brazil  Latin America  0.27  0.94  0.93  1.17 
Central America  Latin America  -0.21  0.10  0.11  0.11 
Chile  Latin America  1.20  0.60  0.61  0.60 
Rest of MERCOSUR  Latin America  2.60  1.61  1.61  1.82 
Venezuela  Latin America  -0.31  -0.29  -0.23  -0.10 
ASEAN  Asia  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04 
Central Asia  Asia  1.31  1.47  1.46  1.45 
China  Asia  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.02 
Hong Kong and Singapore  Asia  0.03  0.05  0.04  -0.21 
India  Asia  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Japan  Asia  0.03  -0.01  -0.00  0.03 
South Asia  Asia  -0.03  -0.05  -0.05  -0.04 
South Korea  Asia  0.16  0.33  0.33  0.34 
Source: MIRAGE results (various specifications) and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: TTA: original MIRAGE version; CTA: consistent tariff aggregator; CTA + FDI: consistent tariff aggregator plus new way 
of modeling FDI; CTA + FDI + BIT: consistent tariff aggregator plus new way of modeling FDI plus bilateral trade agreements. 
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Figure 8. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries (with and 
without developed Asian countries): Bilateral trade flows (in value at FOB prices), 2020  
 
Source:  MIRAGE and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  CTA: consistent tariff aggregator; CTA + FDI: consistent tariff aggregator plus new way of modeling FDI; CTA + FDI + 
BIT: consistent tariff aggregator plus new way of modeling FDI plus bilateral trade agreements. 
A further increase in trade flows is noted when the FDI framework in the model is modified. The 
additional increase, however, is not significant as is, for example, the impact on real income and on GDP, 
especially for those regions that become FDI captors. Gains under this framework are associated mostly 
with increases in investment and production, and to a much lesser extent, with changes in trade flows.  
The positive impact on welfare in most regions is more pronounced when we also consider the 
negotiation of BITs among both regions. This occurs because in this case bilateral FDI flows increase 
strongly with the shift in investor preferences. Thus, introducing BITs into the agreement implies 
additional welfare gains for the participants. As a result, Andean countries experience welfare gains 
instead of the losses they suffered in all other cases when the BITs were not modeled; the same happens 
for Japan. Welfare still declines for Venezuela, although the decline is not as strong as before. BITs 
reinforce the increase in trade flows, although the increase is not sharp. Except in Central America, all 
Latin American countries and regions increase exports (in value) when BITs are included in the 
agreement. When capital flows increase between two regions, bilateral trade costs fall and trade rises. 
However, when BITs are implemented, exports from Asian countries (especially developed Asian 
economies) to Latin America in service sectors fall.  
Trade rises in those sectors that already expanded as a consequence of the FTA. There are some 
exceptions, however, like in the case of the rest of MERCOSUR, where primary exports increase when 
BITs are introduced, as opposed to falling as in the rest of the simulation scenarios. 
The new FDI modeling framework reveals that Latin American countries benefit from an increase 
in FDI inflows. Except for Central America, all regions in Latin America increase GDP when foreign 
investment is introduced in the model, and even more so when the FTA includes BITs. Brazil, Argentina, 
the rest of MERCOSUR, Andean countries, and Venezuela become FDI inflow captors: In all these 
economies, incoming FDI increases by more than 1 percent (in the case of the rest of MERCOSUR the 
increase is almost 7 percent). When we also introduce BITs into the model, the increase in FDI inflows in 
those countries is boosted, reaching 20 percent in the case of the rest of MERCOSUR (see Figure 9). In 
absolute terms, however, the biggest economies in Latin America (Brazil, Andean countries, and 
Argentina) manage to capture most of the new investment inflows, which is in line with empirical  
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evidence (Bittencourt, Domingo, and Reig 2006).
14 The case of Venezuela is worth noting here since it 
not only gains from an increase in FDI inflows but also increases its FDI outflows as a result of an FTA 
between Latin America and Asia that incorporates the BITs. It should be noted that these results are 
obtained when developed Asian countries are part of the agreement, since they become the main FDI 
outflow providers. The situation changes radically when those countries are excluded. Even though bigger 
Latin American economies are still capturing FDI inflows, the increase now is much lower.  
BITs increase FDI inflows for countries participating in the agreement, especially for Latin 
American countries but even for those countries with previous BITs with Asian economies (such as 
Argentina or Chile). For countries that previously did not have a BIT with Japan and South Korea (such 
as Brazil, the Andean countries, and the rest of MERCOSUR), these two developed Asian countries 
become the main FDI providers, whereas in the case of Argentina and Chile, flows come mainly from 
Hong Kong and Singapore.  
At the same time, Latin America loses investments from Europe and NAFTA. With more 
investments coming from ―preferred‖ partners, the rate of return on capital in Latin American countries 
goes down (see Figure 10) and these markets become less attractive for third investors (this is the 
crowding-out effect of third parties). This last effect dominates the positive effect that BITs may have on 
investment from other countries through increased growth and higher profits.  
As already mentioned, Asian economies (especially those of developed Asian countries) increase 
FDI outflows, especially when BITs are included in the agreement. However, just as there is investment 
creation, there is also redirection of FDI, and some regions, such as ASEAN, the European Union, and 
NAFTA, lose their position as recipients of Asian FDI and thereby reduce their real income.  
Figure 9. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: FDI flows, 
% scenario/baseline, 2020 
. 
Source: MIRAGE and authors’ calculations. 
 
                                                       
14 However, this effect might be underestimated because in the model we are not considering economies of scale, so larger 
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Figure 10. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Real 
returns on capital, % scenario/baseline, 2020 
 
Source: MIRAGE and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: CTA + FDI: consistent tariff aggregator plus new way of modeling FDI; CTA + FDI + BIT: consistent tariff aggregator 
plus new way of modeling FDI plus bilateral trade agreements. 
The same FTA between Latin America and Asia, but excluding Japan and South Korea, implies 
smaller welfare gains for most Latin American countries and welfare losses for Central America and 
Venezuela. Bilateral trade flows increase much less under this scenario no matter which model 
specification we are considering (see Figure 11), and FDI inflows to Latin America still increase, but 
much less since the main investment flows come from Japan and South Korea (Figure 12). In this context, 
introducing BITs into the agreement does not have any effect on FDI flows. Most Asian economies are 
better off when developed Asian countries are not part of the agreement: ASEAN and China now have 
welfare increases. These gains are associated with increased FDI inflows into those economies, partly 
coming from Japan and South Korea, which in absence of an agreement with Latin America, direct their 
investment into their own region. The exports of developing Asian countries also increase more when 
Japan and South Korea are not part of the agreement, mainly directed to these latter markets: India 
increases exports of vegetable oils and oilseed to South Korea, while China increases rice and meat 
exports to Japan.  
Other regions, not part of the agreement (Russia, Sub-Saharan Africa, NAFTA countries, the 
European Union), also benefit when Japan and South Korea do not participate. In the case of NAFTA and 
the European Union, this is related to a lower negative impact on exports to Latin American markets. 
Sub-Saharan African countries lose fewer FDI inflows while Russia gains from increased exports to 











Figure 11. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries: Welfare, % 
scenario/baseline, 2020 
 
Source:  MIRAGE and authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  FDI: foreign direct investment; BIT: bilateral investment treaties. 
Figure 12. Impact of free trade between Latin American countries and Asian countries (without 
Japan and South Korea): FDI flows (no BITs), % scenario/baseline, 2020 
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6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Given the increased economic cooperation between Asia and Latin America in recent years, this study 
analyzed the potential trade and investment opportunities that could arise from a free trade area between 
countries of Latin America and those of Asia. From an analytical point of view, such an agreement looks 
interesting, especially since Latin America is specialized in agrifood products, which it predominantly 
exports, while Asian agricultural markets are protected. Similarly, Asian countries intensively export 
industrial products, and industrial protection in Latin America is significant. Our results show the 
implementation of a free trade area benefiting almost all FTA member countries. Under our model, gains 
are especially high for Latin American countries, which substantially increase their exports of agricultural 
commodities and food. The agreement reinforces existing patterns of specialization, with Latin America 
continuing to produce agrifood products and Asian countries maintaining their specialization in industry. 
Export increases are especially high for Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay—the four founding 
members of MERCOSUR—in beverage and tobacco products, oilseeds, sugar, and vegetable oils.  
Excluding developed Asian economies, namely Japan and South Korea, from the agreement has 
different implications for these two regions. For example, without Japan and South Korea, gains for Latin 
American countries are smaller because they no longer benefit from improved access to Japanese and 
South Korean markets. In contrast, developing Asian countries benefit more from the agreement if Japan 
and South Korea do not participate because they gain increased access to Latin American markets without 
having to compete with Japan and South Korea in those markets. 
We should keep in mind, however, that these scenarios do not account for sensitive products, and 
the results therefore reflect the maximum potential gains from an agreement between Asia and Latin 
America. In reality, we might expect lower gains because Latin American exports would increase in 
sectors traditionally sensitive in Asian countries (rice, dairy products, soy, sugar) and vice versa (textiles, 
wearing apparel), these sectors having a high probability of being liberalized only partially. 
This study contributes to the existing body of literature on the impact of FTAs by incorporating 
three innovations into the MIRAGE computable general equilibrium: (1) a new tariff aggregator, (2) a 
new foreign direct investment (FDI) framework, and (3) incorporation of bilateral investment treaties 
(BIT). 
The study finds that when the FDI is modeled, the FTA leads to a greater impact on real income 
and GDP, especially for those regions that become FDI recipients, but it does not lead to substantial 
increases in trade flows. The GDP for all Latin American regions, except for Central America, increases 
when FDI is introduced into the model and even more so when the FTA includes bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). In absolute terms, the biggest economies in Latin America (Brazil, Andean countries, 
Argentina) manage to capture most of the new investment inflows, which is in line with empirical 
evidence (Bittencourt, Domingo, and Reig 2006). Asian developed economies become the largest FDI 
providers. Indeed, both Japan and South Korea have already made some notable investments in Latin 
America over the last few years. In 2008, Japanese and South Korean firms invested over $3 billion in a 
Brazilian steelmaking company (ECLAC 2008a). As a result, their inclusion in the FTA could potentially 
enhance the conditions for further and more diversified investments by these two countries in Latin 
America (see Section 2.2 for more details). Removing them from the agreement, on the other hand, 
changes the situation drastically; although the big Latin American economies still capture FDI inflows, 
the increase is now much lower than when Japan and South Korea were part of the agreement.  
At the same time, Latin America loses investments from Europe and NAFTA (due to the 
crowding-out effect of third parties). With more investments coming from ―preferred‖ partners, the rate of 
return on capital in Latin American countries goes down and these markets become less attractive for 
third investors. This last effect is much more important than the positive effect that BITs may have on 
investment through increased growth and higher profits.  
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE 
Table A.1. Trade arrangements between Latin American and Asian countries as of November 
2010
15 
  Agreement  Status  Coverage 
1  Chile–China FTA 
Negotiations launched in 2005; agreement signed in 2005; 
under implementation since 2006 
Trade in goods since 2006; services 
agreement signed in 2008; investment 
agreement is under negotiation 
2  Chile–India PTA 
Negotiations launched in 2005; agreement signed in 2006; 
under implementation since 2008  Trade in goods 
3  Chile–Indonesia  Feasibility study launched   n.a. 
4  Chile–Japan SEPA 
Negotiations launched in 2005; agreement signed in 2007; 
under implementation since 2007 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 





Negotiations launched in 1999; agreement signed in 2003; 
under implementation since 2004 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investment and related areas 
6  Chile–Malaysia FTA 
Agreement signed in November 2010; 
expected to enter into force in the first half of 2011
17 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investment and related areas 
7  Chile–Thailand 
Feasibility study conducted in July 2006; 
countries announced the beginning of negotiations at the 
November 2010 APEC meeting   n.a. 
8  Chile–Vietnam 
Under negotiations since 2008;  
completed seventh round in November 2010 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investment and related areas 
9  Costa Rica–China FTA 
Agreement signed in April 2010; 




Agreement signed in April 2010; 
not yet in force 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 




Under negotiation since 2006;  
completed first round in 2006; negotiations are on hold 
since 2007 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investment and related areas 
12 
El Salvador–Honduras–
Taipei, China FTA 
Negotiations launched in 2006; agreement signed in 2007; 
under implementation since 2008 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investment and related areas 
13  Guatemala–Taipei, 
China FTA 
Negotiations launched in 2005; agreement signed in 2005; 
under implementation since 2006 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 




Negotiations launched in 2003; agreement signed in 2004; 
under implementation since 2009  Trade in goods 
15 
MERCOSUR–South 
Korea  Proposed/under consultation and study since 2005   n.a. 




Framework agreement signed in 2006; 
no progress on negotiations has been reported since then  Trade in goods 
                                                       
15 Agreement names are arranged in alphabetical order by Latin American countries 
16 The agreement was updated in November 2009; see Myo-ja and Eun-joo 2009. 
17 See NASDAQ 2010.  
30 
Table A.1. Continued 
 




Under negotiation since 2006;  
completed first round in December 2007; 
negotiations have been suspended since 2007  n.a 
19  Mexico–Japan SEPA 
Negotiations launched in 2002; agreement signed in 2004; 
under implementation since 2005 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 




Under negotiation since 2000; completed six rounds of 
negotiations; negotiations have been suspended  
Trade in goods; trade in services; 




Negotiations launched in 2004; agreement signed in 2006; 
under implementation since 2006 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 




Negotiations launched in 2004; agreement signed in 2006; 
under implementation since 2006 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 




Negotiations launched in 2002; agreement signed in 2003; 
under implementation since 2004 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investment and related areas 
24  Peru–China FTA 
Negotiations launched in 2008; agreement signed in 2009;  
under implementation since March 2010 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investment and related areas 
25  Peru–Japan EPA 
Under negotiation since 2009; 
negotiations concluded in November 2010 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 




Agreement signed in November 2010; 
not yet in force  
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investment and related areas 
27  Peru–Singapore FTA 
Negotiations launched in 2006; agreement signed in 2008;  
under implementation since 2009 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investment and related areas 
28  Peru–Thailand FTA 
Under negotiation since 2002; 
second protocol was signed in November 2009 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 




New Zealand, and 
Chile) 
Negotiations launched in 2003; agreement signed in 2005; 
under implementation since 2006 
Trade in goods; trade in services; 
investments are under negotiation 
Sources: Organization of American States (n.d.) foreign trade information system (SICE); UNESCAP (n.d.) trade 
agreements database; Asian Development Bank (n.d.) free trade agreement database for Asia; various web-based news 
articles and updates, official government websites, and the like. 
Notes: FTA: free trade agreement; PTA: preferential free trade agreement; SEPA: strategic economic partnership agreement.
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Table A.2. Bilateral investment treaties between Latin American and Asian countries 
Country  Partner  Signed  Entered in force 
Argentina  China  5-Nov-92  1-Aug-94 
  India  20-Aug-99  12-Aug-02 
  Indonesia  7-Nov-95    
  Malaysia  6-Sep-94  20-Mar-96 
  Philippines  20-Sep-99  1-Jan-02 
  Thailand  18-Feb-00  7-Mar-02 
  Vietnam  3-Jun-96  1-Jun-97 
Barbados  China  20-Jul-98  1-Oct-99 
Belize  China  16-Jan-99    
Bolivia  South Korea  1-Apr-96    
Brazil  South Korea  1-Sep-95    
Chile  China  23-Mar-94  14-Oct-95 
  Indonesia  7-Apr-99    
  South Korea   6-Sep-96  18-Nov-99 
  Malaysia  11-Nov-92  4-Aug-95 
  Philippines  20-Nov-95  6-Nov-97 
  Vietnam  16-Sep-99    
Costa Rica  China  25-Mar-99    
  South Korea  11-Aug-00  7-May-02 
Dominican Rep.  China  5-Nov-98  27-Nov-01 
Ecuador  China  21-Mar-94  1-Jul-97 
El Salvador  South Korea  6-Jul-78  25-May-02 
Guatemala  South Korea  1-Aug-00  17-Aug-02 
Guyana  China  27-Mar-03  26-Oct-04 
  South Korea  31-Jul-06  1-Apr-96 
Jamaica  China  26-Oct-94    
  Indonesia  10-Feb-99    
Mexico  India  21-May-07  23-Feb-08 
  South Korea  14-Nov-00  28-Jun-02 
Nicaragua  China  29-Jul-92  8-Jan-93 
  South Korea  15-May-00  17-Apr-01 
Panama  China  26-Mar-92  14-Jul-92 
  South Korea  10-Jul-01  8-Feb-02 
Paraguay  South Korea  22-Dec-92  6-Aug-93 
Peru  China  9-Jun-94  1-Feb-95 
  South Korea  3-Jun-93  20-Apr-94 
  Malaysia  13-Dec-95    
  Singapore  27-Feb-03    
  Thailand  15-Nov-91  15-Nov-91 
Suriname  Indonesia  28-Oct-95    
Trinidad and Tobago  China  22-Jul-02  24-May-04 
  South Korea  5-Nov-02  27-Nov-03 
Uruguay  China    1-Dec-97 
  Malaysia  9-Aug-95    




Table A.3. Countries and regions included in simulations 















South Korea  
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Table A.4. HS2 chapters 2007 nomenclature 
HS2  Title 
1  Live animals. 
2  Meat and edible meat offal. 
3  Fish and crustaceans; mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates. 
4  Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included. 
5  Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included. 
6  Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots, and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage. 
7  Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers. 
8  Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons. 
9  Coffee, tea, maté, and spices. 
10  Cereals. 
11  Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten. 
12  Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds, and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder. 
13  Lac; gums, resins, and other vegetable saps and extracts. 
14  Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included. 
15  Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes. 
16  Preparations of meat, of fish, or of crustaceans, mollusks, or other aquatic invertebrates. 
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery. 
18  Cocoa and cocoa preparations. 
19  Preparations of cereals, flour, starch, or milk; pastry cooks' products. 
20  Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts, or other parts of plants. 
21  Miscellaneous edible preparations. 
22  Beverages, spirits, and vinegar. 
23  Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder. 
24  Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes. 
25  Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials; lime and cement. 
26  Ores, slag, and ash. 
27  Mineral fuels, mineral oils, and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes. 
28  Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements, 
or of isotopes. 
29  Organic chemicals. 
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Table A.4. Continued 
HS2  Title 
30  Pharmaceutical products. 
31  Fertilizers. 
32  Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments, and other coloring matter; paints and 
varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks. 
33  Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery; cosmetic or toilet preparations. 
34 
Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, 
polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modeling pastes, "dental waxes," and dental preparations 
with a basis of plaster. 
35  Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes. 
36  Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations. 
37  Photographic or cinematographic goods. 
38  Miscellaneous chemical products. 
39  Plastics and articles thereof. 
40  Rubber and articles thereof. 
41  Raw hides, skins (other than fur skins), and leather. 
42  Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than 
silk-worm gut). 
43  Fur skins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof. 
44  Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal. 
45  Cork and articles of cork. 
46  Manufactures of straw, of esparto, or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork. 
47  Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard. 
48  Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper, or of paperboard. 
49  Printed books, newspapers, pictures, and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts, and plans. 
50  Silk. 
51  Wool; fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric. 
52  Cotton. 
53  Other vegetable textile fibers; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn. 
54  Man-made filaments. 
55  Man-made staple fibers. 
56  Wadding, felt, and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes, and cables, and articles thereof. 
57  Carpets and other textile floor coverings. 
58  Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery. 
59  Impregnated, coated, covered, or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use. 
60  Knitted or crocheted fabrics. 
61  Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted. 
62  Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted. 
63  Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags. 
64  Footwear, gaiters, and the like; parts of such articles. 
65  Headgear and parts thereof. 
66  Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seat sticks, whips, riding crops, and parts thereof. 
67  Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair. 
68  Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica, or similar materials.  
34 
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HS2  Title 
69  Ceramic products. 
70  Glass and glassware. 
72  Iron and steel. 
73  Articles of iron or steel. 
74  Copper and articles thereof. 
75  Nickel and articles thereof. 
76  Aluminum and articles thereof. 
77  (Reserved for possible future use in the Harmonized System) 
78  Lead and articles thereof. 
79  Zinc and articles thereof. 
80  Tin and articles thereof. 
81  Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof. 
82  Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal. 
83  Miscellaneous articles of base metal. 
84  Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and mechanical appliances; parts thereof. 
85  Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound 
recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles. 
86  Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts 
thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds. 
87  Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof. 
88  Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof. 
89  Ships, boats, and floating structures. 
90  Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical, or surgical instruments and apparatus; 
parts and accessories thereof. 
91  Clocks and watches and parts thereof. 
92  Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles. 
93  Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof. 
94  Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions, and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not 
elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated name-plates and the like; prefabricated buildings. 
95  Toys, games, and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof. 
96  Miscellaneous manufactured articles. 
97  Works of art, collectors' pieces, and antiques. 
Source: World Customs Organization. 
Figure A.1. Share of Latin America in Asian exports (percent) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Base pour l'Analyse du Commerce International (BACI). 












All exports Exports to Latin America
Primary Agriculture Manufactures
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Base pour l'Analyse du Commerce International (BACI). 
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Figure A.3. Share of Asia in Latin America’s exports (percent) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Base pour l'Analyse du Commerce International (BACI). 
Figure A.4. Sectoral composition of Latin America’s total exports and exports to Asia (percent) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Base pour l'Analyse du Commerce International (BACI).  
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